TRUST PROBLEM IN THE LIGHT OF SOME RECENT DECISIONS by FRIEDMAN, HERBERT J.
THE TRUST PROBLEM IN THE LIGHT OF
SOME RECENT DECISIONS
The unusual amount of hostile criticism that followed the
publication of the decision in the International Harvester Case
was surprising. Reference is not made to the reviews in various
legal publications, for either favorable or unfavorable analysis
of an opinion of such a character might be more or less antici-
pated. But that the daily press at large and the weekly and
monthly publications of the country should rush to the defense
of a corporation, one of the largest and most powerful in the
country, and that their comment should have been unsparing in
finding fault with the reasons and conclusions of a federal court
in attempting to destroy such an organization, was at least
unexpected. There had been so much popular acclaim during
the last decade as decision after decision has been handed down
giving interpretation to the Sherman Act and through such
interpretation decreeing the breaking up and dissolution of hold-
ing companies and so-called trusts and big business in general,
that it must have made a casual observer pause and wonder why
there was such a sudden change. After all, the daily press
instead of attempting to guide the public, endeavors to ascertain
what public sentiment is, and that once found, it cautiously caters
to it. If a large section of the press of the country approves
or disapproves of any particular act we may take it for granted
that the reason for such approval or disapproval is because it
believes that the public itself possibly in a subconscious manner
has first approved or disapproved of the very act. So one is led
to believe that the criticism in the press relating to the Harvester
decision must have gone deeper and must have been more than
merely the expression of a few handfuls of men writing in the
seclusion of their editorial offices; that it reflected, in fact, the
feelings or views of that part of the country at large which had
given thought to the commercial, economic and legal problems
that this decision presented.
To believe for a moment that a decision of this character is
merely an analysis of a legal problem would be a fundamental
error. -Indeed the country at large is concerned but little with
the legal intricacies and judicial ingenuity that may be shown
by the court. The public realizes, however, that a decision of
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such a character interprets the policy of our government on the
most vital economic problem of the day. It realizes that the
legal side of these cases has been so minimized and the economic
side so emphasized that the last congress largely took out of
the hands of the court the power to shape this policy and deter-
mined that in the future a commission composed not of lawyers,
but of men from all walks in life should in these matters be the
arbiters.
The courts, too, have not been slow in recognizing this fact,
for in their more recent decisions they are constantly adverting
to what the public welfare demands and apparently are grounding
their decisions on their conception as to what will be for its
benefit. Thus, in the case of United States v. Great Lakes
Towing Company," the court expressly refused to dissolve the
combination there, for the reason that it would be against the
public interests to do so and said: "Merely enjoining further
operation by the towing company would injure rather than bene-
fit the public by depriving it of the present service pending the
reorganization of a new and sufficient service." And again in
the case of United States v. Keystone Watch Case Company,
2
the court says: "We see no sufficient evidence that the public
interest requires us to break up the existing corporate entity."
(p. 519.) So, too, in the case of Nash v. United States,' the
court again expressed this belief when it used the following
words: "Those cases may be taken to have established that only
such contracts and combinations are within the act as, by reason
of intent or the inherent nature of the contemplated acts preju-
diced the public interests by unduly restricting competition or
unduly obstructing the course of trade."
It then becomes the duty of jurists and judges to ascertain
what this public welfare is, for it is becoming quite apparent
that the courts who may have the courage to expound and
interpret the law in this spirit will be regarded as judges of
independent vision and thought and as men who have laid down
a new judicial foundation upon which our commercial great-
ness can safely grow. If decisions, however, are to rest on this
basis it is time for the courts to break away from the narrow
interpretation of the Sherman Act. If the public welfare is
'217 Fed. 656, 66o.
2218 Fed. 502. See also United States v. American Tobacco Conpany,
221 U. S. 1OG, 179.
3 229 U. S. 373, 376.
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to be conserved and promoted, as far as it may lay in the
hands of the court, then decisions can no longer be justified
that are merely supported by the precedents of the past. To
determine what is for the public welfare it will be essential
that the newer decisions relating to big business be based on
a broad and thorough comprehension of the fundamental prin-
ciples of economics.
It was Achille LoriaO who pointed out, proved and settled
for all times that laws are shaped, formed and evolved by the
economic condition under which we live. Unconsciously the
courts have added their testimony to this great truth by remarks
they have let drop from time to time. When, in years gone by,
one court after another stated that the common law as it existed
in England was adopted by the colonies so far only as its prin-
ciples were suitable to their condition, they were giving an
illustration of Achille Loria's maxim.5
It has often been the case that an old statute or a law
expounded by an ancient decision has been made to square with
a new environment and economic condition of a more modern
life by a court giving some unexpected and new interpretation
to an old law. A century after the courts had determined the
extent to which the common law of England had been adopted
by the colonies, the highest court in this land in the decisions
in the Standard Oil Company and American Tobacco Company
Cases6 again illuminated the Loria truism. For even the laws
and statutory enactments of congress had to bend and shape
themselves, when necessary, in order to harmonize with a newer
economic life. It was in these cases that the court held that Sec-
tions i and 2 of the Sherman Act had to be construed in the light
of reason and the view taken was that, although the Act provided
"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal,"
4Achille Loria, Economic Foundations of Society.
'Wheaton & Donaldson v. Peters & Gregg, 8 Peters 858. See also
Reno Smelting, Milling & Reduction Works v. C. C. Stevenson, 4 L. R. A.
64, 2o Nev. 269. At p. 64 the court, after citing a number of authorities,
says: "From these authorities we assume that the applicability of the
common law rule relating to the physical characteristics of the state
should be considered. Its inapplicability to the Pacific states as shown in
Atkinson v. Peterson, 87 U. S. (2o Wall) 5io applies forcibly to the
State of Nevada."
6221 U. S. 1; 221 U. S. io6.
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nevertheless a reasonable construction must be given to the
words "restraint of trade"; that they "did not embrace all
those normal and usual contracts essential to individual freedom
and the right to make which was necessary in order that the
course of trade might be free." Yet, as a result of the reason-
able construction which was placed upon the statute, it was
pointed out that the generic designation of the first and second
sections of the law, when taken together, embraced every con-
ceivable act which could possibly come within the spirit or
purpose of the prohibitions of the law, without regard to the garb
in which such acts were clothed.
7
No one will object to the conclusion that the supreme court
reached in those cases or find fault with the reasons for its
decision. One, however, may feel that the reason why the act
had to be interpreted in the light of reason was because of the
fundamental drastic economic upheaval that would have followed
a strict interpretation of the statute.
To modify the expression so frequently found in the older
reports relating to the common law, we might say that the
supreme court held in this case that the Sherman Act was the
statutory law only so far as it remained applicable to our economic
conditions. Is it too violent a presumption to infer that the
supreme court probably unconsciously was giving expression to
the economic business necessities of the day?
Can anything be clearer than that the history of legislation
regulating business has followed the history of the economic
development of the country and that neither laws nor decisions
interpreting it will give satisfaction unless there is a clear and
thorough comprehension of the necessities of commerce. We
may be sure that without the great concentration of capital there
never would have been a Sherman Act on the statute books
and we may also feel certain that had the congressmen and
representatives two decades ago had a clearer and more thorough
knowledge of the basic laws of commerce, that if they had more
closely perceived what would have proved beneficial or detri-
mental to the public, the Sherman Act would have been better
drawn and would have absolved our courts from the necessity
of trying to make it square with the needs of everyday business
life.
It must be expected that, as decisions are handed down from
time to time which endeavor to formulate rules under which
722i U. S. i8o.
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business may be carried on, the public will applaud or withhold
their approval as they.may conceive themselves to be benefited
or injured by the new rule regulating the game. If the decision
in the Tnternational Harvester Case met with so much adverse
criticism from lay minds, it is well worth while to endeavor to
ascertain the cause of this dissatisfaction. Such dissatisfaction
undoubtedly must indicate that the decision is somewhere at
variance with the vital business necessities of the day and we
must all realize that sooner or later the law will shape itself
either through statute or by decisions in court so as to conform
to the public welfare. This question may be asked with all the
greater propriety because in several decisions more recently
handed down by federal courts of equal standing results prac-
tically diametrically opposite have been reached.'
Let us then examine the International Harvester decision.,
Why was the corporation held to be illegally organized? What
did the court hold? The court ascertained that five large
competing companies in the year 1902 combined; that since
then the new company, among other things, manufactured from
80 to 85 per cent of the binders, mowers, and reapers and rakes,
produced in this country. In the majority opinion, the court
found "that the treatment by the corporation of its smaller
competitors had been fair and just" (p. 993) and that "in the
main the business conduct of the company towards its com-
petitors and the public has been honorable, clean and fair." (p.
OO2.) In his dissenting opinion, Judge Sanborn expressly found
from the facts, which are nowhere contradicted, "that the
consistent and persistent purpose, policy, rule of action, and
practice of the defendants has been and is to avoid and prevent
all acts and methods unfair, unjust, or oppressive towards their
competitors, to leave competition with them free, to give to
them full and fair opportunities to secure shares of the trade
and business in which they are all engaged, and to carry on their
trade honestly, justly, and fairly." (p. ioo8.) He also found
that the price was substantially the same in 1912 for a better
machine that it was for a poorer one in 19o2; that the company
had not limited the production of machinery, deteriorated the
quality, or decreased the wages of the laborers employed to
make them, or the prices paid for the materials required to con-
8U. S. v. Great Lake Towing Company, 217 Fed. 656; U. S. v. Key-
stone Watch Case ComPany, 218 Fed. 502.
9 214 Fed. 987.
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struct thefi or threatened so to do, but that they were doing
the opposite of these things. (p. OO9.) It appeared from this
dissenting opinion that neither consumers, purchasers of the
goods of the Harvester Company, its employes or the jobbers
with whom they did business had any real complaint against its
business methods.
Why then did the court dissolve a big corporation carrying
on its business in this admittedly honorable way?
The reasons given were two.
The first was that some ten years prior to the filing of the
bill, the company had been formed by the joining together of
some five independent companies; that this resulted at least
in the elimination of competition between the five companies
and that the contract that these independent companies entered
into to form that combination was therefore illegal.
"We think it may be laid down as a general rule that
if companies could not make a legal contract as to prices
or as to collateral services they could not legally unite,
and, as the companies named did in effect unite, the sole
question is as to whether they would have agreed on prices
and what collateral services they would render, when their
companies were all prosperous and they jointly controlled
8o to 85 per cent of the business in that line in the United
States. We think they could not have made such an
agreement." (p. 999.)
The second reason given was that the company did not
represent a natural normal growth.
"The International Harvester Company is not the result
of the normal growth of the fair enterprise of an indi-
vidual, a partnership or a corporation. On the contrary,
it was created by combining five great competing com-
panies which controlled more than 8o per cent of the
trade in necessary farm implements, and it still maintains
a substantial dominance. That is the controlling fact;
all else is detail." (p. iooi.)
These are the reasons given for dissolving the company. Was
the public justified in refusing to accept them as valid? Did
the court consider the public welfare, in announcing them?
A reader may readily say that it makes very little difference
whether a decision were distasteful or not to the public; that
the only question involved was whether it was sound legally.
The point that the writer is trying to make, however, is that
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in cases of this character no decision can be legally sound that
is not fundamentally correct from an economic point of view;
that correct economics will be the hub on which the final decisions
regulating big business will turn, and the court will find that those
decisions that disregard the economic welfare of the community
will ultimately be swept away as vicious and inherently unsound;
that, moreover, the courts are recognizing this fact more and
more every day. Nowhere in the Harvester opinion can any
reference be found to the thought that the leading economists
in this country from time to time have given to these matters.
The court minimized the public welfare; the illegality of a
contract in 19o2 is magnified. This is the vice of the theory
on which the decision is based.
That an illegal act was done in 1902 when the five companies
combined is probably correct. That act was probably an infrac-
tion of the Sherman Act. But the suit was not brought for ten
years thereafter and in the decision the court clearly says that
no complaint is found with the way in which the business was
conducted for the seven years preceding the filing of the suit.
What difference did it make to the public whether a decade ago
five large corporations were guilty of illegally combining so
long as during the intervening period neither the public nor
any part of it had been hurt? What difference did it make
what happened ten years ago so long as the business of the
competitors of the company had in the meantime remained
unrestrained and had a free field in which to develop their own
business and so long as the consuming public received a better
product at the same price?
If Judge Smith is correct in his reasoning that there is no
such thing as a statute of limitations against a company ille-
gally organized; if he is correct when he says that the govern-
ment may bring suit at any time after an illegal act has been
committed, no matter how fair the company may have been in
its dealings since then, one must ask himself what businesses,
if any, are safe from a dissolution. For it must be remembered
that, after all, the courts have held again and again that the
Sherman Act merely gave expression to the English common
law relating to monopolies and restraint of trade.10 Conse-
quently, if the decision of the International Harvester Case is the
correct exposition of the common law, any consolidation, no
10 U. S. v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. io6, i79.
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matter how small it may have been, or any act that tended to
unreasonably restrain trade, no matter when the agreement was
made, or when the act took place, whether ten years or a cen-
tury ago, was illegal and that illegality persists and is sufficient
for any court to order the dissolution of such business at any
time. This becomes a very serious consideration when one
realizes that almost every business that exists, or has survived
for a period of fifty years, at some time or other probably did
something that at least in some minor way tended to monopolize
the industry that it may have been engaged in, or tended to
restrain trade. If Judge Smith is correct, then all of these
businesses should be broken up, for the great and grave con-
sideration is whether any illegal contracts were made at any
time by which trade was unreasonably restrained. The opinion
is not based on the finding as to whether the company has become
a public menace. It is based on the fact that at the time of the
organization of the company an illegal act was entered into by
the five constituent companies. It is submitted that should the
courts carry this doctrine to its logical conclusion it would bring
about an economic revolution. Is it not apparent that what the
public is concerned with is the illegality of the present and not
with the possible illegality that may have died decades ago? The
Sherman Act was probably directed against specific evils that
may or may not be produced through combination. It was
aimed against the attempt to either monopolize or restrain trade.
The combination that neither does one nor the other and does
not menace the public welfare by crushing its competitors and
coercing the public in all probability does not transgress the
law, and when the only crime of which it was guilty was that
of having done an illegal act at its inception it hardly merits
the punishment of being destroyed.
Even according to later decisions the mere fact that a con-
tract made in 19o2 tended to restrain competition is not sufficient
proof that it actually did restrain competition. This at least
was the holding of the court in the Keystone Watch Case, where
the facts were much stronger in favor of the government with
respect to oppressive practices than in the Harvester Case. In
the former case the court said:
"But another and ordinarily a better way of determin-
ing whether a course of conduct under examination is
in restraint of trade is sometimes available, and that is
by considering its actual effect. It goes without saying
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that such a test can only be applied after the course in
question has actually been carried Qut in some degree,
has actually been tried by experience; and this leads to
the further question: When should the standard of
reasonableness be applied? Evidently this will depend
on the time when the question is submitted for decision.
This time may either precede the proposed course of con-
duct, or it may follow the beginning of such a course so
quickly that nobody of experience, or no sufficient body,
has yet come into existence. In that event the nature of
things compels the court to enter the field of prophecy,
or of probable anticipation. In such a situation, nothing
else can be done. A court can only deal with the situa-
tions that are laid before it, and in the case supposed it
must avail itself of whatever light may be had, and must
exercise its best judgment with such aid as may be at
hand. But, if the suit be deferred until the lapse of time
and the actual effect of the conduct complained of have
permitted facts to accumulate and have tried the project
in question by the test of experience, we can hardly doubt
that prophecy or probable anticipation should be consid-
ered inferior in force to the evidence of what has actually
taken place."' 1
Strange enough to say, however, judge Smith in the Harvester
opinion contradicts himself, for though he directs the company to
be dissolved because it was originally brought about by five
different organic companies combining, nevertheless he states:
"There is no limit under the American law to which a
business may not independently grow, and even a combina-
tion of two or more businesses, if it does not unreasonably
restrain trade, is not illegal, but it is the combination which
unreasonably restrains trade that is illegal, and if the
parties in controversy have eighty or eighty-five per cent.
of the American business and by the combination of the
companies all competition is eliminated between the con-
stituent parts of the combination then it is in restraint of
trade within the meaning of the statute under all of the
decisions." (p. iooo.)
How two companies could be combined without eliminating the
competition between the constituent parts is a mystery. If the
competition were not eliminated the two constituent companies
would not be combined. What then is the essential difference
between two or five companies being brought together? The
competition in either event is eliminated and the illegal act must
' U. S. v. Keystone Watch Case Co., 218 Fed. 502, 517.
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therefore persist, and where would the courts say that reason-
able restraint ends and unreasonable restraint begins? What
percentage of the trade may an organization have before it
becomes a monopoly? The United States Steel Company main-
tains it has only between fifty and sixty per cent of the entire
business of the country. Does this lower percentage absolve
it from guilt? Other companies against which the government
has brought suit claim to have had less than forty per cent.
Where do the courts draw the line? In industry there must be
an elasticity and it is safe to say that no "rule of the thumb"
can settle or solve this enigma.
It is not disputed that if a combination like the Harvester
Company or the Keystone Watch Company were about to be
formed to-day the court might in a proper proceeding order its
dissolution, for it might well be urged that the purpose of the
contract was to form a monopoly and that trade should be
restrained. It is submitted, however, that because the court
could dissolve an organization at the time of its formation it
would not have the same right to do so a decade thereafter when
it had been demonstrated and shown from experience and by
the testimony of its competitors and by the statistics relating to
the particular trade that no such restraint had been exercised.
In the one instance there might be a fair presumption that a
great injustice to the competitors of such a business, as well
as to the public, were to be perpetrated. After a decade had
gone by, however, the grounds for any such presumption in the
light of experience could no longer exist. Ten years thereafter
evidence is available in order to ascertain what the purpose and
objects of the organization were. Were the purpose and objects
merely to secure efficiency, to reduce costs, to eliminate waste
and duplication-consequences that naturally follow a more
highly organized business-then no such presumption could any
longer live. The presumption would have to give way to the
actual facts. The writer is not endeavoring to contend that a
combination that was organically illegal in 19o2 can necessarily
cure its illegality by dealing fairly with the public, by establish-
ing fair prices and by permitting its competitors to live. He
does assert, however, that the basis for the presumption that a
monopoly exists from the fact that the combination was made,
apparently in restraint of trade, is swept away when it is shown
by years of experience that none of the acts that were contem-
plated or feared have taken place.
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The second reason advanced for dissolution of the company
was that given by Justice Hook, namely, "that the company was
not a result of normal growth or the fair enterprise of an
individual, a partnership or a corporation." He was not par-
ticularly concerned as to whether the contract of 19o2 violated
the law or not. What impressed him most was that five large
companies had gotten together. Everything else, he declared,
was mere detail.
It is submitted that the distinction that has existed in the
minds of a number of lawyers and judges between the business
which is the result of so-called natural growth and development
and that" which is the result of a combination of a number of
going concerns has, neither in law nor in economics, any sound
basis. In the first place it is very difficult to say what is meant
by natural growth or development. A smaller business may
assume or may buy at a bankruptcy sale the good-will of one
of its former competitors. It may add to its capital or increase
its output by taking in a new partner and in this way open up
a new factory from time to time; or two men who have been
engaged in the same business heretofore may enter into a part-
nership and join their respective businesses. All this is com-
monly regarded as natural growth and development but
nevertheless in each instance the capital has been added and the
business increased by the enterprise not of an individual. Even
smaller business men have been known to make contracts to
divide territory, to maintain prices, to limit their output and to
have blacklists. It is only when these acts become the acts of
large units that attention is attracted to them and the public
thinks of combinations and speaks of restraint of trade. Smaller
combinations have been going along side by side with the bigger
ones, only in greater number. They have countenanced the same
methods of doing business that have been pursued by the so-called
trusts. These smaller business men have been forced to combine,
for they discovered that competition is not the life of trade but
that there generally goes with it a strangling process that stults
growth, checks expansion and spells failure and ruin if carried
to its ultimate conclusion.
There seems to be an impression that only big business has
coerced the small business man. However, it is probably not
too venturesome to say that small business men themselves have
forced out of business and coerced their small competitors to
a greater extent than the big combinations have done. Big
THE TRUST PROBLEM
business at least has felt the restraint of being constantly in
public view and subject to daily criticism. When one small
business man has forced another out of business by unfairly
underselling him and then finally takes over that business, can
it be said that that is the result of fair enterprise? But, irre-
spective of the difficulty of ascertaining what can be said to
be the result of fair enterprise, we are sill met with the point
that it is impossible to say what possible difference there can
be whether any particular organization, no matter how big it
may be, is the result of fair enterprise of an individual or a
group of individuals or whether it is the result of the combina-
tion of a number of corporations. Suppose that the McCormick
Company, one of the individual component parts of the Inter-
national Harvester Company, had succeeded in forcing out the
other large four competing companies and gradually had absorbed
their business so that they covered the same territory as the
International Harvester Company does to-day, what difference
would there be so far as the public welfare or the interpretation
of the Sherman Act may be concerned? Though the Sherman
Act states that every contract, combination in the form of trust
or otherwise is declared to be an illegal combination in restraint
of trade, we must admit that were this language carried to its
last analysis it would so tie the hands of business men as to
almost put an end to all growth.
Thus in the Keystone Watch Case the court aid:
"Section 2 gives us no help, for "any" part, if strictly
construed, might range from a minute and inconsiderable
fraction to a part just less than the whole. If, therefore, a
merchant, either an individual or a corporation, -by the most
commendable zeal and industry should succeed in divert-
ing to himself a very small part of a competitor's business,
he would be monopolizing a "part" of the trade, and
would be condemned by the letter of the act. And in
like manner, if the statute is using the strict meaning of"restraint of trade," no merchant could act in combina-
tion with his own partner, in successful competition for
part of a rival's business, even by the fairest and most
honorable means, except at the risk of "restraining" trade.
Further examples are needless; many more might be
given. Clearly, therefore, as it seems to us, the act could
not have been intended to bear a meaning so subversive;
and it seems plain that the supreme court was abundantly
justified in turning to the rule of reason, and in holding
that of necessity congress must have been dealing with
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undue or unreasonable restraints of trade, whether such
restraints take the form of monopolies in whole or in
part, or of concerted action under any guise whatever."
(p. 516.)
It is submitted that this reasoning is correct and conclusive.
It demonstrated that only a broad and liberal interpretation of
Section 2 of the act prevents thousands of minor transactions
from being held to be contracts in restraint of trade. And it
shows that there is not sufficient justification for the holding
of a court that a business which is the result of the combination
of integral units is in itself sufficient ground for condemning it
as illegal or dissolving it. For many a business, apparently the
result of the enterprise of an individual, has become large and
strong through many contracts that it has entered into in the
past restraining trade.
Size, according to Judge Hook, becomes a menace only when
it is the result of combination. If size, however, is a menace, it
must be so irrespective of combination; and if size on the other
hand is not a menace, then nothing can make it become so
because it is the result of combination. In spite of statutes,
the courts will ultimately find a reason for permitting com-
bination where the public welfare is not hurt. And should any
industry fall into the hands of an individual and threaten the
public welfare, either the courts or congress will ultimately find
a means of holding it in check. In other words, in the last
resort, the forum for determining these questions will be this
public and the sole consideration will be whether the public
welfare has been benefited or deterred.
Another reason why the decree of dissolution seems to be
extremely harsh is that, for a long while, both lawyers and
courts have been struggling to ascertain what the Sherman law
means and how it should be interpreted. As pointed out, this
interpretation, in the writer's opinion, must -ultimately square
with the economic necessities of the day. But confessedly dur-
ing that period, it has been a guess what contract or what act
would be regarded as inhibited by it, and if any act is so vague
that its meaning cannot be ascertained, the court should be
careful before it destroys the organization that in good faith
attempted to comply with it. There is no charge anywhere in
the Harvester decision that the organizers were conscious of a
violation of any law. Had the company during its history been
guilty of oppressive acts and had been a menace to the public,
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then it might be urged that no leniency should or ought to be
asked because of its inability to have comprehended the meaning
of the act. But where the public has not been harmed, such a
decree is a blow struck at business; the economic efficiency of
the country is halted, progress is stayed. We may feel that
courts should adopt a less harsh remedy where a company during
its history had been free from such oppressive business tactics.
This was accomplished in both the Keystone Watch Case and
the Great Lakes Towing Case, supra, though in each instance the
corporations had been guilty of far more oppressive tactics than
in the Harvester case. In those cases, the court came to the
conclusion that the defendants should be enjoined from pur-
suing their coercive methods and the court specifically found
that no benefit would accrue to the country at large by entering
a decree to dissolve these companies. If this result should obtain
in two cases where the defendant was less entitled to mercy than
in the Harvester case, it seems that it would only be fair to
extend the same leniency to that company. There is all, the
more reason why this method of relief should obtain; should
it not bring about the results desired, a trust could always later
on be dissolved.
Is this not a saner conclusion than immediately decreeing a
dissolution? Should, for any reason, an injunction not correct
the conditions, a corporation could always thereafter be dis-
solved. A dissolution once effected could only at a serious cost
be repaired. Economists tell us the more efficient an industry,
the more highly it is organized, the better it is for the entire
community. Surely, then, courts should only as a last resort
wipe out the efficiency of an industry that a dissolution neces-
sarily carries along with it.
The court that attempts to solve these great questions on
purely legal reasoning and bases its opinion on the intricacies
and niceties of the law is on the way to decisions that will not
give satisfaction. There is much reason to believe that the
courts recognize that there is necessity for a broader and more
comprehensive way of dealing with these questions. Law-books
and precedents contained in them will not satisfy. It is impos-
sible to ascertain from them the economic knowledge it is
necessary to have in order to be able to say what may or may
not be for the public benefit. Each one of these decisions should
be more or less of an economic brief as to the policy of this
country in dealing with great business organizations. In other
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words, the question of what is a monopoly and the question of
what is a reasonable restraint of trade must be looked upon
more in the light of pure economic reasoning.
So it may be doubted whether decisions will give thorough
satisfaction unless economists and judges are drawn more
closely together; unless courts are willing to pay more heed
to what the economists have to say on these vital questions.
Thus, to revert to the Harvester decision, the court assumed that
because the company controlled about eighty per cent of the
output of certain agricultural machines, though competition had
remained free and open, and though the business of their com-
petitors had grown, nevertheless the mere fact that it had such
a big percentage of the business made the Harvester Company
as to those products a monopolist. It is interesting to note that
while there is some dispute on this point, the foremost economists
in the country feel that this economic doctrine is entirely
incorrect.
In order to ascertain their views on the subject a query
embodying this point was put to a number. In reply thereto, the
following answers were received:
Arthur T. Hadley answered by saying:
"I can only make the obvious answer that the posses-
sion of sixty-five or even eighty-five per cent of the trade
does not necessarily create economic monopoly; but that
the larger the percentage controlled by one concern, the
greater is the presumption which its defenders have to
rebut, and the larger the chance that a Alonopoly may in
fact exist."
J. Lawrence Laughlin answered by saying:
"The percentage of business done is aside from the
point. If there is no obstruction to competition, and an
industrial organization succeeds in gaining the major part
of the trade, it is direct evidence of its superior efficiency.
That means that any other competitor, showing at any
time superior efficiency, can take the trade away from it."
Jeremiah W. Jenks answered by saying:
"I should reply that in my judgment, a corporation can-
not be considered a monopoly from an economic viewpoint
if its competitors are in the field as freely as is the cor-
poration and there is no obstruction to other competitors
entering the field. Second, under these circumstances, the
possession of even eighty-five per cent of the trade in the
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particular line under consideration does not give an
economic monopoly."
F. W. Taussig answered by saying:
"I suppose the ground upon which an economist might
defend such a decision as that of the district court in the
Harvester Case, is that there is danger of monopoly con-
ditions and monopoly prices when one concern controls
seventy or eighty per cent of the output. Like almost
all questions, this must be decided not according to what
has happened in a particular case, but according to the
trend to be ordinarily expected. Now, we simply do not
know with any certainty, even with an approach to cer-
tainty, whether such commanding control means 'unreason-
able' prices and monopoly profits. Something of that
sort seems to have happened in other cases of commanding
control; but whether it would happen again in the future,
with the stamping out of unfair competition, I should not
venture to say."
Jacob H. Hollander answered by saying:
"An industry is naturally monopolistic when it tends
by the superior profitableness of large scale production
to grow in size at the expense of its competitors, and this
without any illegal preferential advantage granted it, and
without resort to methods and practices at variance with
prevailing business standards."
"It seems to me entirely consonant with a sound social
policy to tolerate the increase in relative size of such a
business unit and indeed the wisdom of attempting to
arrest its growth by legislative prohibition may be ques-
tioned. On the other hand, it will be readily inferred from
the foregoing that when the monopolistic tendency results
from illegal discrimination or from unwholesome business
methods, such growth is undesirable."
If there were discrimination, in other words, or unwholesome
business methods, such as Mr. Hollander refers to in his answer,
or were there unreasonable prices and monopoly profits, as
Professor Taussig suggests in his answer, then from the point
of view of an economist the government would be warranted
in interfering. However, apparently all the economists agree
that the mere fact that an organization has from seventy to
eighty per cent of the volume of business in its line, as long
as its profits are not unwarranted and there is a free open field
to other competitors, does not make it a monopoly. When one
considers how far reaching a dissolution may be, the many
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interests that are at stake, the great disorganization of industry
resulting, the uncertainty that such dissolution gives to com-
mercial enterprises, such a decree should not be lightly entered
and particularly does the excuse vanish when the only reason
for it is based not upon public welfare but because of a technical
legal violation that took place a decade before the suit was
brought.
The days of uncontrolled competition are gone. With their
passing, waste and extravagance in business have been checked.
The courts have held that restraint and combination to a reason-
able degree are proper and legal. Judging from the criticisms
of the International Harvester Case, the public not only has
accepted this doctrine, but also has come to be opposed to a
dissolution of big business units unless the people at large have
been harmed. May we not hope that the courts in the future
in determining the degree of restraint or combination that shall
be permissible, will turn to the economists and solve these
intricate problems with their aid on a scientific basis. A sane
policy relating to big business will thus be evolved. The main
consideration will not be whether an illegal act was committed
a decade or more ago; it will not be whether a company repre-
sents the natural development of an individual or a group of
individuals; the only consideration will and should be what is
for the public good.
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